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Let me start by expressing my gratitude to the editors of the Verfassung blog and
to the contributors to this debate. When I was writing the book, the very idea of it
being read sent me into a panic. It still does today, but I am lucky to have found
generous and insightful readers in Peter Niesen, Carlos Pérez Crespo, Markus
Patberg and Esther Neuhann. Their comments raise both general methodological
points and specific historical questions about the chapters. I will try to answer them
in turn: I will first engage with the methodological critiques and I will then move to
interpretative questions about the story I tell in the book, its protagonists and their
historical contexts.
The main aim of the book is, as I see it, to explain how the idea of constituent power
has been used to make sense of the democratic principle according to which power
belongs to the people. This goal, as Patberg rightly points out, is meta-theoretical
in kind and comes with two implications. The first is that I do not develop a theory
of constituent power of my own, nor do I offer a normative defence of my preferred
interpretation of the idea. On the contrary, I am interested in exploring the variety
of ways in which the concept of constituent power has been interpreted in the
past two hundred-odd years. I am thus not interested in finding the best or the
correct theorisation of constituent power, but in bringing back to life the competing
interpretations that have existed in history and that still influence how we think about
democracy today. The second implication, which follows from the first, is that I
position myself in a somewhat odd relation to contemporary theorists of constituent
power. They are both my main interlocutors, in that I criticise their interpretations of
the history of the idea, and my object of analysis, in so far as they too are part of the
history of constituent power I am interested in reconstructing.
In his comments, Patberg expresses concerns about the implications of precisely
this way of engaging with contemporary theories of constituent power. He
argues that my approach leads to a sort of relativism because I take all existing
interpretations of the idea of constituent power to be equally valid. I think Patberg
picks up on a very important argument, one which I am willing to defend but which
lends itself to some ambiguity, so I am grateful to have the chance to clarify it.
When I discuss contemporary accounts of constituent power, I take issue with those
theories that defend the superiority of a version of the idea on the ground of it being
a better description of the ‘reality’ of constituent power, and look for this ‘reality’ in
the history of political thought. I find this empiricist approach problematic because
constituent power is a concept that has no immediate correspondence to a ‘reality’
out there in the world. There is no independently existing object ‘constituent power’,
which the concept describes. It thus follows that there cannot be a straightforwardly
true or false description of constituent power, but there only are competing accounts
of what constituent power is. And, at a conceptual level, all these accounts are
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equally valid, because there is no external reference point, no ‘reality’ of constituent
power, that could prove any of them false. It is not because a given interpretation of
constituent power does not fit with the definition I have in mind, that it is disqualified
from being valid qua theory of constituent power. Hence, my claim is that, at a
conceptual level, all self-described theories of constituent power should be engaged
as such and should be taken seriously for what they purport to be. In other words,
they are all equally valid because constituent power is, like many other political
ideas, an ‘essentially contested concept’, as Walter Bryce Gallie would have it.
And it is only by seeing all theories as equally valid that I can bring back to life the
processes through which the meaning and implications of the idea of constituent
power have taken the shape they have today.
Yet, at this point, I would like to introduce a distinction. Although I maintain that all
theories of constituent power should be considered equally valid from a conceptual
point of view, I do not believe that they ought to be seen as equally valid from
a political perspective. Political theories offer visions of how politics should be
organised and we are drawn to endorse a theory instead of another on the basis of
the normative purchase they have on our political reality. These different normative
preferences correspond to different judgements about the political validity of any
given theory. Hence, these theories cannot all be equally valid politically. Saying the
contrary would amount to denying the very possibility of normative theorising, which
is far from what I intend to do. I am happy to recognise that different theories have
differently valid purchases on our political reality, but I am not interested in theorising
this difference in the book. Yet, arguing that all theories are valid conceptually but
not politically is not enough to answer Patberg’s critique. He is not satisfied with the
possibility of distinguishing between theories on the basis of their political validity,
but believes that a theory can be proved normatively superior to others by reference
to an absolute standard, as he exemplifies in his discussion of Vedel’s theory of
constituent power. This is a position I do not wish to criticise. However, I do not
share it. Differently from Patberg, I do not believe that there is an absolute standard,
that remains constant across time and social contexts, which we can use to assign
superior political validity to a theory of constituent power over another. By contrast,
I believe that any normative argument is, at its core, a political judgment and that,
as such, it is contingent on the context in which we find ourselves. This, it should
be noted, does not amount to pure power struggle, but refers instead to a series
of complex interactions between political, social and economic circumstances that
shape our way of seeing politics and the political world around us. And it is precisely
because I believe in the contextual validity of theories of constituent power that I
have chosen not to think about its history normatively, but contextually.
In his comments, Patberg points out how this approach might result in a form of
relativism. I value Patberg’s concern, but I believe that there is a difference between
claiming that all political values are equally good and that they are contextually
situated. The first is, effectively, a form of relativism, which amounts to saying that all
theories of constituent power are equally valid from a political perspective. This, as
outlined above, is not what I believe. The second option is, instead, more consistent
with my approach in that it recognises different values to different theories, but sees
this judgment as historically situated and hence admits that its validity is limited to
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the context in which it operates. It is thus not relativism, but a form of scepticism
that lies behind my work. This, like all philosophical outlooks, carries some risks,
one of which is its proximity with relativism, but it also has merits. While not denying
the relevance of normative theorising, it offers a different lens through which to look
at the question of constituent power. One that makes of its capacity to describe
and explain the political possibilities opened up by the idea of constituent power
its primary objective. It is an approach that assigns great importance to assessing
how constituent power has been used in history, what political projects it has served
and how these historical uses of the idea inform our thinking today. In prizing these
interpretative questions over normative evaluations, it takes for its object all theories
of constituent power in so far as they had an impact on our world qua theories of
constituent power; and it allows to situate contemporary theorists within this long
history, one in which their theorisations are made sense of as part and parcel of
how constituent power has been conceived of in the past two centuries. Some might
see in this approach a dangerous lack of judgment, but it is precisely thanks to this
absence that it becomes possible to bring back to life the complexity, the diversity
and the messiness of our political world, and I believe that there is an intrinsic
intellectual value in being able and willing to do that.
 
A history of constituent power, as any history of an idea, requires developing
criteria to identify which bits of discourse qualify as part of the idea. In this book,
I have made a specific and, perhaps, unusual choice: I have decided to take into
account only theories that explicitly use the language of constituent power. This,
as Neuhann points out, means looking at the expressions ‘constituent power’ and
their equivalent in other languages, notably ‘pouvoir constituant’, ‘potere costituente’
and ‘verfassungsgebende Gewalt’, which I take to be synonyms. Focussing on
the use of these expressions helped me to avoid the risk of writing a genealogy,
in that I did not start by assigning, ex ante, a meaning for constituent power and
retracing its presence in history. This would have resulted in a linear story of just
one meaning of the idea, which is not what I wanted to do. On the contrary, I
wanted to explore the diversity and variety of meanings that have been assigned
to constituent power. At this point, however, it is important to emphasise that my
attention to the language of constituent power is just the methodological premise
of the book, and not its argument. In other words, I do not argue that constituent
power is nothing but a language, whose uses have nothing in common with each
other, as Neuhann seems to suggest. Instead, the argument of the book is that the
theories of constituent power I have studied, as different as they are, have all at
least three things in common. First, they are ways of making sense of the principle
according to which power belongs to the people, which means that they are all
attempts to define who the people are, in any given context, and what their power
amounts to. Of course, each of the theories I discuss in the book offers a different
answer to these questions, and hence a different interpretation of the principle of
popular power. However, and this is the second common element, they all theorised
constituent power as different from contemporary ideas of sovereignty, a point on
which Niesen has raised an interesting question to which I will return shortly. The
last element these theories have in common is that, starting from after the French
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revolution, they all refer back to Sieyès’ initial theorisation of constituent power.
This means that, although very different from each other, they share references to
Sieyès and to the history of the revolution. So, although I do not start assuming any
element of consistency between these theories, a part from their use of the language
of constituent power, I arrive at the conclusion that, beyond their differences, there
are some substantive elements of convergence. This, however, is a conclusion that
I have arrived at inductively from the study of how the language of constituent power
has been used.
I would now like to go back to Niesen’s concern about my treatment of constituent
power as distinct from sovereignty. As mentioned above, one of the arguments of
the book is that all the theorists I look at imagined constituent power as conceptually
distinct from sovereignty, whether it was national, parliamentary or popular. Niesen’s
worry is that, by doing so, I end up collapsing the idea of popular sovereignty,
which according to Niesen indicates the law-making power of the citizens, into
the Jacobin version of the idea or into the broader category of sovereignty, which
he finds normatively problematic. To this concern, I can offer three answers. The
first is that, whenever I discuss understandings of national or popular sovereignty
in the book, I do not do so using my authorial voice, but I reconstruct what any
given theorist of constituent power understood by sovereignty. So, for example,
when I claim that Sieyès introduced constituent power as an alternative to the idea
of popular sovereignty as direct rule by the people, I do not argue that this is the
correct meaning of the concept ‘popular sovereignty’. Instead, I engage with it only
insofar as it is precisely that, however normatively undesirable, understanding of
sovereignty that motivated Sieyès’ thinking about constituent power. This is because
I do not believe I should engage in distinguishing between normatively desirable
and undesirable understandings of sovereignty in this context. Sovereignty, in all its
various iterations, plays a secondary role in the book, which is limited to explaining
what motivated given thinkers to theorise constituent power in the way they did.
If I started to argue with their renditions of sovereignty, for example with the fact
that Arendt confused popular sovereignty with national sovereignty, I would stop
doing historical work and thus fail to achieve the aim I had set for myself: explaining
how given theories of constituent power had come about, and how they related
to coeval accounts of sovereignty. Second, in the same way as I do not believe
that there is a historically correct definition of constituent power, I am not willing to
project my preferred account of popular sovereignty onto history. As much as I like
Niesen’s idea of coupling up constituent power and popular sovereignty as legitimate
expressions of popular power and distinguishing them from national sovereignty,
I do not think this can be done historically. History is messier than our normative
desiderata. My last thought on Niesen’s question is that theories of sovereignty are
indeed very diverse, especially when they refer to popular or national sovereignty.
However, I think that they all have something in common, which is precisely what
distinguishes them from constituent power. The latter implies, in its very words, the
idea of constituting something. It is thus in a direct conceptual relation with the idea
of a constituted power. By contrast, sovereignty, in all its various iterations, has no
necessary conceptual connection to the institutionalisation of power, regardless
of whether it is attributed to the people, the nation or parliament. Although it can
of course be used to legitimise the creation of legal and political institutions, the
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concept itself indicates a power that is self-standing and does not bind it to a type
of politics that is constituted. This is precisely what Sieyès and Arendt, to name
just two thinkers, found troubling about sovereignty. And it is this type of reasoning
I am interested in reconstructing in the book, so as to explain what motivated my
protagonists to think about constituent power in the way they did.
Moving on to the story I tell in the book, I would like to start by addressing Niesen’s
questions about Sieyès. He points out an inconsistency between what Sieyès
argues in Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État? and my claim that Sieyès believed that
the constituent power of the people could only be exercised during moments of
constitution-making. This is an interesting issue. On the one hand, Niesen has put
his finger on a true tension that exists in my account of Sieyès as much as in his
own writings. Part of the problem here has to do with the type of sources available.
Sieyès’ most known text is Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État?, a revolutionary pamphlet
published just a few months before the Estates General were summoned which
contains the inflammatory statements mentioned by Niesen in his comments. Yet
this is of course not the only and perhaps not even the most important of Sieyès’
texts. There is a myriad of other works, mostly constitutional drafts, speeches,
comments on constitutional matters and Sieyès’ own notebooks. These, I contend,
are much more representative of his own thinking, as they cover a large part
of Sieyès’ life. They also return a rather different image of the author from the
one we get by reading Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État?, one in which Sieyès is not
concerned with revolutionary politics and the people’s radical power to change the
constitution. Instead, he is deeply interested in finding ways to stabilise the new
constitutional system once and for all. And it is to this Sieyès that I have given space
in my book. On the other hand, however, the idea according to which the people
never alienate their constituent power and can always change the constitution
is not necessarily inconsistent with his preference for constitutional stability and
limiting popular involvement in politics. This is because Sieyès did prize stability
within the constitutional order. Hence, he tried to limit the people’s involvement in
ordinary political as much as possible, but also believed that the people could always
overthrow the existing constitution and create a new one. This, however, would only
legitimately happen in extraordinary times, during revolutionary events. Rather than
a change of mind, we are dealing with a change of tone and accent, which is posited
not on the people’s involvement in extra-ordinary politics, but on the stability of the
constitutional system.
A thinker who did not dwell on interpretative questions about Sieyès’ thought is Carl
Schmitt. As I argue in the book, he willingly misinterpreted Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-
État? to advance his own theory of constituent power as the sovereign’s power to
take the fundamental decision in the name of the people. In tracing the intellectual
trajectory that connected Schmitt to the idea of constituent power and to Sieyès,
I emphasise the importance of German thinkers such as Theodor Mommsen and
Egon Zweig, as well as of some French jurists who, in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, systematised Sieyès’ thinking on constituent power. Pérez Crespo
commented precisely on this trajectory, which he finds lacking in engagement with
the French public law tradition and, more specifically, with the work of constitutional
theorists of the likes of Léon Duguit, Maurice Hauriou and Carré de Malberg. Indeed,
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Pérez Crespo believes that Schmitt’s theory of constituent power derives from
his being situated at the intersection between this French tradition and German
Staatslehre, more so than his engagement with Mommsen and Zweig. I think it is
always difficult to pinpoint with any degree of precision how much a given thinker
was influenced by a range of earlier, or even contemporary, authors. Bearing that
in mind, I would respond to Pérez Crespo’s point in two ways. The first would be
to say that probably we do not have to choose between either of those options,
in so far as they all, to some degree, influenced Carl Schmitt. Nonetheless, it is
true that I do not explore the influence that the French constitutional theorists
mentioned above had on Schmitt as much as it is needed, and more research
should be done to reconstruct this intellectual encounter. Yet, and this is my second
point, I decided to put the accent on Mommsen and Zweig more than anybody else
because I think that they are key to explain Schmitt’s engagement with Sieyès and
his theory of constituent power. As Pérez Crespo writes in his comments, the French
public law tradition saw in constituent power an organ of the state, an institutional
feature of modern politics that finds its primary expression in the work of constituent
assemblies. This approach to constituent power is quite different from the Sieyès of
Qu’est-ce que le Tiers-État?. Equally, it is radically different from Schmitt’s theory
of constituent power, which refutes the reduction of constituent power to a state
organ and prizes instead its pre-statist character, in that it is a power that acts
beyond the legal structure of the state. It thus seems to me that, although the idea
of constituent power was very much part of both German Staatslehre and French
public law in the first two decades of the twentieth century, it is from Sieyès that
Schmitt got the elements required to conceive of it as the power to take fundamental
political decisions in exceptional times. As I explain in the book, much of what
Schmitt takes from Sieyès is the result of his systematic misinterpretation of the
political thought of the French revolution and his limited engagement with Sieyès’
writings beyond the 1789 pamphlet. Yet it is Sieyès’ theory of constituent power that
gave Schmitt the conceptual tools to develop his own account of the idea. And this
engagement with Sieyès’ revolutionary ideas could only come from Zweig’s study
of the history of constituent power, which discusses Sieyès at length and in a way
that is not consistent with French public law’s limited interest in Sieyès. Similarly,
Mommsen made evident to Schmitt the historical and conceptual connection
between dictatorship and constituent power, which then became a centrepiece of
his theorising about modern democratic politics. This too could not be gauged by
reference to the French public law tradition, but comes from the study of Roman
law. In other words, Pérez Crespo is right to say that the connection between
German Staatslehre and French public law is very important, and that its influence
on Schmitt’s constitutional theory should be explored in much more detail. However,
I think that this connection was more influential for Schmitt in relation to his broader
thinking about constitutional law than to his theory of constituent power. The latter,
it seems to me, primarily comes from Schmitt’s engagement with Sieyès, as filtered
through the works of Zweig and as made urgent by Mommsen’s study of constituent
power in Roman law.
Schmitt’s interpretation of Sieyès is key to understanding subsequent moments
in the history of constituent power. Not only, as Patberg points out, legal scholars
Costantino Mortati, Georges Vedel and Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde took
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inspiration from Schmitt’s account of constituent power to make sense of post-war
constitutionalism in Italy, France and Germany. Hannah Arendt too was deeply
influenced by Schmitt’s (mis)interpretation of the French revolution and of the role
that Sieyès had played in it. One effect of such influence is that she misunderstands
Sieyès as a theorist of sovereignty and not of constituent power. Therefore, she
lists him as yet another philosopher, which in Arendt’s view amounts to saying
that Sieyès is only interested in thinking about politics in the abstract, relying on
vague and dangerous ideas such as sovereignty. This is problematic for Arendt
because it jeopardises the very possibility of politics, which she understands as
a deeply practical activity. And it is precisely because of this distinction between
politics and philosophy that, in the book, I give space to Arendt’s argument according
to which constituent power is not a philosophical concept but a political practice.
Neuhann raises questions about this move which, she argues, seems to contradict
my initial statement according to which the first half of the book deals with political
history, while the second with political philosophy. I do not see any contradiction but,
to explain why, I need to clarify the terms of my engagement with Arendt’s work.
Following Neuhann’s reasoning, I will say the following: what I am interested in
discussing in the book, with my own authorial voice, is how Arendt interpreted the
history of constituent power, the elements of novelty she introduced, the misleading
interpretations of Sieyès she subscribed to and the contextual relevance of all the
above. This means treating her in exactly the same way as I treated Sieyès, Vedel
or Schmitt: by taking her ideas and her motives seriously for what she believed
them to be. This means exploring the fact that she refused to see herself as a
philosopher and that she believed her account of constituent power not to be a
political philosophy. However, the fact that I give space to her own beliefs about
what she was doing does not mean that I am blind to the fact that her critique of
political philosophy (“ii” in Neuhann’s classification) is itself a political philosophy
(“i”), which relies on particular historical moments, such as Roman history (“iv”),
to make sense of the political circumstances in which she was living (“iii”) via the
language of constituent power. And my authorial voice is no different in my treatment
of Arendt from that of Sieyès: in both chapters, I am interested in reconstructing why
they thought about constituent power in the way they did. In the case of Sieyès, that
requires paying attention to the dynamics of revolutionary politics and using archival
sources such as debate transcripts and speeches. In the case of Arendt, the focus is
more straightforwardly on her own writings which, notwithstanding her disapproval,
could be classified as political philosophy. I thus see no contradiction in either my
treatment of Sieyès and Arendt, or in my statement according to which the second
half of the book deals with sources that are not primarily political, as constituent
debates are, but philosophical.
I wish to thank Carlos Pérez Crespo, Esther Neuhann, Markus Patberg and Peter
Niesen one more time. Their comments and questions have certainly made my
engagement with my own book more thoughtful and have given me an opportunity to
better clarify its methods and arguments.
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